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RAMPART:
A CRYING NEED TO RESTORE
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY
CarolA. Chase*
I. INTRODUCTION
What has been revealed about police practices at the Los Ange-
les Police Department's Rampart Division is certainly a scandal.
That it occurred, however, is not a surprise in light of the rules we
have in place to deal with police misconduct that occurs during
criminal investigations. First, officers who violate the law during
criminal investigations are not held directly accountable for their ac-
tions. Thus, for example, an officer who has violated a suspect's
Fourth Amendment rights is not directly punished for his or her mis-
conduct, and, therefore, the officer is not efficiently deterred from
future violations. Rather, the "penalty" for police officer misconduct
is suppression of evidence, which often renders a case unprosecu-
table, thus benefitting the criminal defendant while simultaneously
failing to penalize the law-breaking police officer. Second, police
officer perjury in support of criminal cases has become so wide-
spread that it is widely referred to as "testilying."' Although judges
are aware that officers lie to preserve cases, they are reluctant to
catch officers in their lies, especially when the consequence of doing
so will lead to the suppression of evidence which is essential to prove
the prosecution's case.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. See Christopher Slobogin, Reform: The Police: Testilving: Police Per-
jury and What to DoAboutIt, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1040 (1996).
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II. LACK OF DIRECT POLICE OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY2
When police officers violate the law during the course of a
criminal investigation, as when they violate the Fourth Amendment
search and seizure rules or the rules for obtaining statements from an
arrestee under Miranda v. Arizona,3 the law addresses these viola-
tions primarily by excluding any evidence unlawfully obtained.
While this denies the prosecution any benefit it might have incurred
by the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence, it does little to
hold individual police officers accountable for their violations of the
law. In theory, of course, the offending officer will feel the sting of
being blamed for a lost prosecution. However, whether he or she
even suffers this passing indignity depends upon whether the officer
is informed of the outcome, whether the officer is apprised of the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct, and whether a court's decision to
suppress the evidence is viewed as meritorious or as merely a bad
decision by a "misguided" or "pro-defendant" judge. In any event,
although the prosecuting team suffers a negative--and perhaps dis-
positive-consequence as a result of the police officer's violation of
the law, the officer is not individually penalized by the court.
In one survey in which law enforcement personnel were asked if
the threat of suppression of evidence influences their conduct in in-
terrogating arrestees, nearly one-third responded that it was only a
minor concern or no concern at all.4 When asked the same question
with respect to their conduct in searching for and seizing evidence,
nearly nineteen percent responded that it was only a minor concern
or no concern.5 In other words, a substantial number of police offi-
cers admit that they are unconcerned with the consequences that may
flow from their conduct if the courts determine that they have vio-
lated the law. This is understandable in light of the fact that the con-
sequences of their actions do not fall directly upon them.
2. This section deals only with police officer violations of law which oc-
cur during the course of a criminal investigation. It does not address inde-
pendent crimes committed by police officers, such as narcotics trafficking.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. See L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule-A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary
Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the
Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 720-22 (1998).
5. See id.
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In all but the most egregious of cases--those relatively rare
cases where police misconduct leads to civil rights charges or those
extraordinary cases, as in Los Angeles, in which racketeering
charges are filed-a police officer faces no direct consequences of
his or her violation. The message is clear: If you violate the rights
of a criminal suspect, you will not be held personally accountable.
There is little downside for the officer who violates the law in the
course of a criminal investigation. The upside, of course, is that it is
often easier to secure the evidence needed for a criminal conviction
if the officer does not scrupulously follow the law. The lesson
learned is that it is permissible to operate outside the law so long as
you do not get caught. If you are caught, at least you will not be per-
sonally punished. And you may still succeed in convincing the court
that you were acting within the law.
I. ACCEPTANCE OF POLICE OFFICER PERJURY
Thus far we have considered the lack of consequences that be-
fall an officer who is found to have violated the law in the course of
a criminal investigation. Even more troubling, however, is that most
police officer misconduct escapes detection, at least in part, because
the courts too often accept as true the exaggerated or perjured testi-
mony of police officers testifying at suppression hearings.
It has long been apparent that police officers testify untruthfully
to avoid detection of their misconduct. Early evidence of this is
found in a study by Columbia law students undertaken in 1968.6 The
goal of that study was to ascertain what effect Mapp v. Ohio,7 which
made the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule mandatory in state
prosecutions, had upon the investigation of misdemeanor narcotics
offenses. The study compared data for arrests from pre-Mapp and
post-Mapp decisions. Of particular note are findings relating to po-
lice officer accounts of the location of narcotics seized during the
course of an arrest. In the pre-Mapp period under study (1960-61),
narcotics were found on the arrestee in 34.7% of all narcotics arrests,
whereas that figure dropped to 3% during the post-Mapp period in
6. See Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-SeL-re
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 87 (1968).
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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1961-62.8 Further, in 1960-61, narcotics were found after being dis-
carded in close proximity to the arrestee in 16.8% of all arrests and
one year later, in 1961-62, that figure rose to 43.2%.9 How can one
explain the nearly three-fold increase in the number of arrests based
upon "discarded" narcotics other than to conclude that police officers
were tailoring their testimony or their police reports to comport with
their understanding of what the law permitted in the wake of Mapp?
That certainly seems a more likely conclusion than the notion that
narcotics defendants had dramatically changed their behavior and
were now three times more likely to discard their narcotics for the
police to find in the open!
Twenty-four years later, a study based upon a questionnaire sent
to Chicago area judges, public defenders, and prosecutors confirmed
the practice of police officer prevarication in an effort to avoid sup-
pression of evidence.' 0 The study revealed that a majority of judges
and public defenders believed that police officer perjury was the
main factor in limiting the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule."
In fact, eighty-one percent of all respondents expressed their belief
that the possibility that evidence would be suppressed caused police
officers to change their testimony rather than their behavior during
searches. 12 Additionally, thirty-eight percent of the respondents said
they believed supervising personnel in the police department "en-
couraged" police officer perjury, while sixty-seven percent believed
that the supervising personnel tolerated it.' 3 Nine of eleven judges,
nine of fourteen prosecutors, and fourteen of fourteen public defend-
ers held the opinion that judges sometimes fail to suppress evidence
even when they know the searches were illegal.' 4 Thus, whether due
to police perjury or willful judicial blindness to police misconduct, it
is evident that a significant amount of police misconduct goes unde-
tected and unpunished.
8. See Comment, supra note 6, at 94.
9. See id.
10. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrance, Perjury and the Heater Factor:
An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv.
75, 75-76 (1992).
11. See id. at 98.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 108.
14. See id. at 119 n.198.
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Further, a study surveying law enforcement officers asked offi-
cers if they had ever heard of law enforcement personnel misrepre-
senting or failing to fully disclose information concerning a search or
seizure to avoid having evidence suppressed.' 5 Of the responding of-
ficers, 17.4% acknowledged that this happened during in-court testi-
mony, while 24.2% acknowledged that they knew of this happening
in police reports.' 6 These responses almost certainly understate the
problem because there is a natural reluctance on the part of many
police officers to admit that they are aware of false statements or
perjury on the part of fellow officers. It is particularly noteworthy,
therefore, that some of the respondents acknowledged having ob-
served this police officer dishonest behavior in excess often times-
even up to fifty times.
17
What we have seen is a clear indication that police officers on
occasion modify their account of events leading to the discovery of
evidence in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence in crimi-
nal proceedings. Further, this practice is not effectively discouraged,
and may even be encouraged, by police supervisory personnel. Fi-
nally, judges are reluctant to make findings that lead to the suppres-
sion of otherwise reliable evidence, even though they are aware that
the evidence was unlawfully seized.
United States v. Heath,'8 involving a suppression hearing, illus-
trates the problem of judicial tolerance of perjured or exaggerated
police officer testimony. In Heath, police officers testified that after
they had received a tip about drug trafficking out of a particular mo-
tel room, they knocked on a door and informed the defendant who
answered the door that they were aware of possible drug activity in
the room 9 The officers then asked if they could come in, after
which the defendant opened the door and said, "Come on in.,,20 The
officers testified that they subsequently advised the defendant and a
companion that they did not have to speak to the officers or consent
to any requests to search, and that they were free to tell the officers
15. See Perrin et al., supra note 4, at 725.
16. See id. at 725-27.
17. See id. at 725 n.429.
18. 58 F.3d 1271 (8th Cir. 1995).
19. See id. at 1273.
20. See id.
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to leave at anytime. Finally, the officers testified that after they
saw one of the men attempt to slide a shoebox under the bed, they
asked if they could look inside the box and the defendant con-
sented.22 The box was found to contain crack cocaine. 3
The defendant's version of these events was very different. He
testified that following a knock on the door, the officers stated that
they had probable cause to search the room for narcotics.24 He said
that one officer said harshly, "[I]f you don't let me in I am going to
get a f ..... search warrant and tear your room apart., 25 The defen-
dant let go of the door, the officers pushed their way in, and an offi-
cer grabbed the shoebox and opened it.
2 6
The trial judge believed the officers' version of the facts and de-
nied the motion to suppress, which the defendant then appealed as
clear error.27 The appellate court refused to grant relief, stating that
"[a] district court's decision to credit a witness's testimony over that
of another can almost never be clear error unless there is extrinsic
evidence that contradicts the witness's story or the story is so inter-
nally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable fact-
finder would not credit it."'28 One of the appellate judges, who con-
curred "only because it is not the province of the appeals court to
make credibility assessments,, 2 9 expressed his doubts over the credi-
bility resolution of the trial judge:
The police officers' saccharine account of the events ...
leaves a bitter aftertaste. Rarely, if ever, have I encountered
a case in which the police conduct was so mild-mannered
and the suspect so acquiescent. The "fact" that [the defen-
dant] would so willingly consent to the search of his motel
room and, more specifically, the shoe box, which he knew
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1274.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 1275.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1276 (McMillian, J., concurring).
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contained drugs and drug paraphernalia, is surprising, to say
the least.
Why are judges reluctant to recognize and reject perjured or ex-
aggerated police officer testimony? The answer is not difficult to
discern. Judges hesitate to make rulings that lead to the suppression
of incriminating evidence against criminal defendants because these
rulings are very unpopular. One only has to consider the plight of
Federal District Court Judge Harold Baer, Jr. to appreciate the pres-
sures that may be brought to bear upon a judge whose findings lead
to the suppression of incriminating evidence. Judge Baer's ruling
was heavily criticized by public officials, including the President of
the United States.3' Ultimately, the judge reversed himself . If a
federal judge-whose appointment is a life tenure-can feel strong
public pressure based upon a suppression ruling, it stands to reason
that state court judges-many of whom must face periodic public
reelection-would feel even greater pressure to avoid suppressing
incriminating evidence against an "obviously guilty" defendant. In
many instances, the decision of whether to suppress evidence will
depend upon judicial resolution of witness credibility. Judges, then,
have an incentive to believe even the "saccharine"---or perjured-
testimony of a police officer in order to preserve the admissibility of
incriminating evidence.
30. Id. (McMillian, J., concurring).
31. See Ian Fisher, Gingrich Asks Judge's Ouster For Ruling Out Drug
Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1996, at B4; Clifford Krauss, Giuliani and
Bratton Assail U.S. Judge's Ruling in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1996,
§ 1, at 25; Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1996, at Al (stating that White House Press Secretary Michael D.
McCurry remarked that the President regrets Judge Baer's decision and that the
President's decision to ask for Baer's resignation would turn on how the judge
ruled on a motion for reconsideration).
32. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), va-
cated by 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Judge Baer insisted that his rever-
sal was based on additional evidence presented at the reconsideration hearing
which caused him to change his opinion about the credibility of the defendant
and the arresting officers. Yet, several legal experts commenting upon the
original ruling concluded that it had been "well within the law." Don Van
Natta, Jr., Judge's Drug Ruling Likely to Stand, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 1996,
§ 1, at 27.
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IV. To RAMPART... AND BACK
What does the foregoing have to do with the Rampart scandal,
where sworn law enforcement personnel stand accused-upon ap-
parently solid evidence-of planting evidence and otherwise "fram-
ing" individuals who are not guilty of the crimes for which they were
arrested and of which, in many cases, they were convicted? The an-
swer is simple: We have created a culture that has placed officers
above the law, or at least has placed them in a position where the
consequences of violating the law do not affect them personally.
Even if they are caught red-handed, they will not feel the sting of
punishment. Further, they have learned the lesson that by tailoring
their testimony to the parameters set by the constitutional limits on
police investigative practices, even if they are justly accused of mal-
feasance, they may succeed in thwarting the only mechanism in
place to deter misconduct of this type: the exclusionary rule. They
will also almost certainly escape any type of personal sanction. So
long as their account of the facts is plausible and is not contradicted
by physical evidence, the courts have a strong incentive to accept un-
critically the officer's account of the events that occurred during the
investigation. To preserve the admissibility of evidence, the courts
strive to credit police officer testimony. All of this has created a
culture of arrogance. In the "us against them" world of criminal in-
vestigation, the means may be viewed as easily justified by the end--
especially when the end is the use of incriminating evidence, albeit
unlawfully seized, against a criminal defendant the officers know is
guilty of a crime. This approach apparently meets with public ap-
proval, if the reaction to the opposite result reached by Judge Baer is
any indication.
It is not much of a leap for police officers in this "end justifies
the means" culture to go beyond tailoring testimony and police re-
ports to preserve the admissibility of evidence against a criminal de-
fendant known to the officers to be guilty of the offense charged.
The next logical-if wrongful-step is to tailor or invent the evi-
dence needed to gain a criminal conviction against someone the po-
lice strongly suspect is engaging in criminal activities, when there is
no true evidence to tie him or her to a particular offense. The Ram-
part scandal is, in fact, the natural result of this culture we have de-
veloped in which police officers are believed, even when it is
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illogical to do so. Even when found to have violated the laws gov-
erning criminal investigations, the officers escape any direct sanc-
tion.
We must revisit the way we treat police lawlessness in the
course of criminal investigations. If we are to avoid additional Ram-
part-style scandals, we must change our rules to permit direct pun-
ishment of police officers for violations of the law. This will cer-
tainly more effectively deter violations of the law by police officers.
Further, we also need to encourage prosecutors and judges to be
more critical in their evaluation of police officer accounts of their
criminal investigations. As a part of this we need to reexamine the
exclusionary rule in light of evidence indicating that courts strain to
avoid suppressing incriminating evidence even if the only way they
can do so is to ignore obviously perjured testimony. In short, we
need to take steps to ensure that police officers truly recognize that
they-like the rest of us, including the criminal suspects they pur-
sue-are not above the law.
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